Social learning is the basis of traditions and culture, and in his keynote presentation at the meeting Andrew Whiten (University of St Andrews) focussed on the evidence for cultural learning in apes and what this can tell us about the evolutionary foundations of our own extraordinary cultural propensities. This evidence has come from both field studies and experiments in captivity, showing that populations differ, for example, in the way they use tools to obtain food, and that many differences are not due to genetics or local ecology, but to the way individuals pick up local habits and modes of behaviour from observing others. There is now abundant evidence for such cultural learning in chimpanzees, for example in how stick-tools are used to procure otherwise inaccessible food sources. There are interesting contrasts with humans, howeverhuman children are great direct imitators, closely copying the actions of demonstrators, whereas chimpanzees tend more to 'emulate', focussing on the desirable results of actions rather than directly copying them. There is also limited evidence for the 'ratcheting' up of traditions in apes -the gradual build up of complexity as additional features are invented and transmitted to others. And it seems that teaching, where one individual makes an effort to support the development of skills in another, hardly occurs in non-human apes (there is more evidence for teaching in predators, like meerkats), whereas of course it can be of great importance in human learning.
Some proponents of the 'social brain hypothesis' have emphasised the notion of 'Machiavellian intelligence' -the idea that it can be advantageous for an individual in a society to understand what others know and 'think' and potentially to be able deliberately to influence others' knowledge and behaviour. This was touched on by Chris Frith in his introductory talk, where he mentioned the important concept of 'Theory of Mind' -having an idea about the minds of others, and using that to interpret and predict, and perhaps manipulate, their behaviour. This may seem a very human trait, but there is evidence for such attributions in some other species, for example, as explained by Nicky Clayton (University of Cambridge), in corvids which hide food caches for the future. These famously clever, large-brained, social birds have a remarkable ability to remember where they have hidden huge numbers of food items. One danger they face is from thieves -other birds who see where they have hidden a food item, remember this, and then grab it for themselves when the cachers have left the scene. This has led to some remarkably complex cache protection tactics on the part of the birds that hide the food. They use distance, shade and barriers to reduce the likelihood that the observers will be able to accurately see where they have hidden the food and even know when to conceal auditory information, namely when the potential thief can hear but cannot see. Furthermore, if they notice another bird seeing them cache food, they can wait until the other bird has gone, and re-cache the food in new locations that the potential thief does not know about -fascinatingly, this is done by birds that have been thieves themselves in the past, but not by naive birds, suggesting that the behaviour is based in some sense on an extrapolation to another individual of a propensity they 'know' they themselves have. In short, it takes a thief to know one. This kind of
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No animal is an island, entire of itself. With the exception of the last living dodo, any animal lives in a world where there are others like itself -members of its own species, with which it might cooperate or compete, and the only group from which it can find an effective breeding partner. Conspecifics are a distinct and important part of an animal's environment, even if it is not a member of a notably social species. So important that specific cognitive mechanisms have evolved for interacting with others of the same species -for recognising them, communicating with them, learning from them, understanding what they are up to... These mechanisms are the subject of the burgeoning field of social cognition, the focus of a CellPress 'LabLinks' meeting held at Birkbeck College on 3 rd December 2010, arranged by Stavroula Kousta (Trends in Cognitive Sciences), Meredith LeMasurier (Neuron) and me, with academic organizers Chris and Uta Frith (University College London).
Social cognition is not confined to social animals, but one reason why many are so fascinated by it is the observation that, among vertebrates at least, those species with particularly large brains (for their size) are often the more social members of a group -for example, anthropoid primates, corvids or cetaceans. This led to the 'social brain hypothesis', which speculates that an important factor in the evolution of large brains was their requirement to deal with the complexities of life in a group. At the meeting, Lars Chittka (Queen Mary University of London) pointed out that this seeming correlation is far from true in the insects, where eusocial species can form social groups of staggering size. If you consider the 'mushroom bodies', parts of the insect brain implicated in learning and memory, variation in their size shows no clear relation to sociality. Indeed, the solitary ancestors of social bees and wasps grew larger mushroom bodies when they evolved a parasitoid lifestyle ~100 million years before becoming social -perhaps because of the cognitive demands of central place foraging, brood care, and prey identification. While one can argue that the large brains of some social mammals might reflect the particular complexity and subtlety of their interactions, the interactions between individuals in eusocial insect societies can also be quite sophisticated -for example, there is evidence for individual recognition, based on facial markings, that is important in the maintenance of dominance hierarchies in wasps.
Anyone with a child, particularly a teenager, will be well aware of the way they readily pick up modes of speech and behaviour from their peers. Social learning is a powerful force, and Chittka pointed out that, again, it can be seen in insects, the example given being consensus building in swarming honeybees, where "scouts" return to the hive with information about potential new nest sites. A returned scout communicates information about possible new sites -and does so with an enthusiasm and determination that reflects its confidence that the site will be a good new home. The sum of the activities of all the returning scouts can be represented as a vector, which varies in length and direction over time, gradually building to a consensus on where to swarm to find the best available new nest site. Editorial knowledge extrapolation is not trivial. Indeed, Clayton presented evidence that young children of two years of age have great difficulty projecting their own experience of seeing or not seeing to infer whether Mummy does or doesn't know.
Social information of this kind is clearly very important in humans, and insights into the brain mechanisms involved were described by Matthew Rushworth (University of Oxford). He described an experiment where the subjects made a choice that would potentially lead to a reward, where the choice was informed by a social partner with a suggestion of variable truthfulness. On the basis of their experience over a number of trials, the subjects learnt the level of honesty of their partner. By functional magnetic resonance imaging of brain activity during the experiment, regions of the brain could be identified that seem to be important in making such social predictions. And by using a technique known as 'diffusion tensor imaging', which essentially measures biases in the diffusion of water molecules that correlate with the presence of neural tracts, information can be gained about connected networks of brain regions that operate in social learning -the new data presented by Rushworth implicate connections between the paracingulate and the posterior superior temporal sulcus cortex.
More basic functions have been ascribed to the role of 'mirror neurons' in social cognition -neurons that fire when a particular action is either observed or performed by an individual. The mirror neuron system has become a subject of great, but rather contentious, interest in social neuroscience, a controversy touched on by James Kilner (University College London). An early view was that such neurons, first described in the macaque brain, are part of a system for understanding the goals or intentions of an action. Others argue that there is little hard evidence for this, and that it is more likely they have a 'lower level' function in sensorimotor learning. Kilner discussed evidence for and against mirror neurons functioning in action understanding, but I think it is clear there is a long way to go before we have a definitive answer to the question of what these enigmatic neurons are really doing.
Problems of social cognition are thought to underlie certain important behavioural disorders -notably, autism. In particular, individuals with autism are thought to be poor at understanding the mental states of others -to have a deficit in Theory of Mind. Francesca Happé (King's College London) presented evidence that autism may also involve a decreased ability to understand one's own mind -that autism is also a disorder of self-awareness or "Theory of own Mind". This challenges the commonsense notion that we know our own minds directly, while inferring what others may be thinking. Instead, experimental and neuroimaging evidence suggests that similar representational mechanisms allow us to know our own and others' thoughts. Thinking of autism as a developmental disorder of self-awareness may open the way to new interventions for social disability.
Somewhat more malign behavioural problems can result when people fail to show normal understanding of, and responses to, emotional states of others -when they exhibit callous and unemotional traits that can be associated with psychopathy. Essi Viding (University College London) described work on psychopathic tendencies in children, in particular evidence for a strong genetic influence on those antisocial children that also show callous and unemotional traits, the ones particularly in danger of becoming psychopaths as they grow up. Her group has been looking for brain anatomical correlates of such behaviours, with early indications from imaging that an increase in the grey matter in the cingulate cortex is associated with callous and unemotional behaviour.
A related set of antisocial behaviours collectively known as conduct disorder can emerge either early in childhood or in adolescence. It has been suggest that early-onset conduct disorder has a distinct neurodevelopmental basis, whereas the adolescent-onset variant is a learnt behaviour based on copying deviant peers. Andy Calder (MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge) presented neuroimaging data, using a tractography technique related to that described by Matthew Rushworth, implicating in particular a brain tract known as the uncinate fasciculus, and, surprisingly, this was seen in both early and late-onset conduct disorder.
This issue of 'nature versus nurture' in social cognition was further addressed by David Skuse (University College London), who reported a twin study using game theory to look for the most heritable aspects of cooperative behaviour. In games where the subjects can cooperate, or be spiteful -reducing other's rewards for no personal gain -it was the latter, negative trait that showed most evidence of heritability.
But it is clear that the social behaviour of individuals can be influenced, for good or bad, something that naturally exercises the minds of policy makers throughout the World. Ben Seymour (University College London) described how policy makers are looking to social neuroscientists for news as to how positively to influence human behaviour. It remains to be seen to what extent detailed neurophysiological data can be put to good use by government, but it is clear that behavioural insights can be remarkably effective at 'nudging' people to behave well. Seymour introduced his talk with a striking example: simply by painting a fly on the inner surface of a male urinal, the level of spillage in public gents' toilets was dramatically reduced. More realistically, a recent report by academics at Imperial College and the Institute for Government ('Mindspace'), essentially a handbook on how to apply insights from behavioural science and social cognition to public policy, has generated genuine interest amongst policy makers in the UK.
The meeting showed, I think, that those working on the various aspects of social cognition in diverse species, from humans to other apes, to birds and insects, have a lot to say to each other -and perhaps it will nudge them to communicate with each other a bit more.
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